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Abstract  
In this paper, we introduce firm heterogeneity in the context of a model 
of non-compliance with minimum wage legislation. The introduction of 
heterogeneity in the ease with which firms can be monitored for non 
compliance allows us to show that non-compliance will persist in  sectors 
which are relatively difficult to monitor, despite the government 
implementing non stochastic monitoring. Moreover, we show that the 
incentive not to comply is an increasing function of the level of the 
minimum wage and increasing function of the gap between the 
minimum wage and the competitive wage rate. 
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    1. Introduction 
 
eceived economic theory tells us increase in the minimum 
wage leads to an increase to all wages and thus to 
unemployment (Jones ,1987, Brown ,1988). The new growth 
theory , for its part, has shown , in certain context, that inequality can be 
harmful to growth (Alesina and rodrik, 1994, Persson ans Tabellini, 
1992), in that the presence of low income individuals increases the 
incentive to tax productive capital. Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), 
for their part, argue that a low level of demand, in conjunction with low 
levels of remuneration can be an impediment to the adoption of new, 
and more productive, technologies. Cahuc and Michel (1996) construct 
an endogenous growth model in which higher salaries can be stimulant 
to growth in that they encourage the accumulation of human capital, 
which in the framework of  Lucas-type model of growth leads to higher 
growth rate. 
 
       At microeconomic level, it has been shown by Azam (1992) that a 
increase in the minimum wage in Moroccan agriculture leads to a 
positive effect on agricultural output, when one uses an efficiency wage 
model which takes into account the institutional characteristics of a 
family which shares revenues in order to finance consumption. 
 
      While minimum wage legislation may, through the reduction in 
inequality it entails; have a positive effect on growth, it is not at all 
R 
certain that firms will respect such legislation. Non-compliance of firms 
with minimum wage law, has been studied in a number of 
environments. Ashenfelter and Smith (1979) conclude that (i) the 
enforcement of minimum wage legislation is incomplete despite the 
government’s inspection efforts not being stochastic, and (ii) the 
incentives not to comply are increasing in  the absolute value of elasticity 
of the demand of labor. Grenier (1982) finds the opposite result. Chang 
and Ihrlich (1985) shows that both of the preceding results are partially 
incorrect because the methodological stance they adopt is not 
appropriate.  
   
       Finally, all of the above mentioned studies do not account for the 
heterogeneity in compliance with minimum wage legislation actually 
observed in the empirical data. That is, they fail to explain why certain 
sectors comply while others do not. 
 
          The purpose of the present paper is to take this sectoral 
heterogeneity into account, in the sense that certain sectors are easier to 
monitor than others. This in turn allows us to show why non compliance 
persists in certain sectors of activity despite frequent inspection by the 
government agencies. 
 
 
 
 
      2. The Model 
       Consider an economy constituted by two sectors: a formal sector 
which respects minimum wage legislation , and informal sector which 
does not respect the legislation and which is competitive. Firms share 
common production technology, where labor is the only input, given by   
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Labor market is regulation is given by a minimum wage w for the formal 
sector. In the informal sector, on the other hand, the competitive wage is 
given by ww
o
 . In order to insure compliance with minimum wage 
legislation, firms are subject to inspection. They may be detected as not 
being in compliance with the minimum wage legislation with 
probability: 
                                  1,0,1,0  ,      qqq                                      (2) 
where q is the frequency of inspection, and  parameterizes the success 
of this inspection; we assume that the detection technology is uncertain, 
it depends upon the observability of the activity, the type of evidence 
available, etc. A firm, which is found to be guilty of paying a wage  
ww  is assumed to  have to pay a fine : 
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where l is the size of labor who were hired at the below minimum wage , 
and f is the penalty rate. 
         We assume that firms which decide not to comply with the 
minimum wage legislation pay a cost c  in order to do so. This cost is 
assumed to have cumulative density  cH  over the interval  ccc , . 
Thus, the number of firms which decide not to comply with the 
minimum wage legislation is given by those firms whose cost of non 
compliance satisfied the following weak  inequality  (4): 
 
               
  lwlpF
lwwfcwllpFqcwllpFqcwllpFq

 111 
 
where p is the market price of the good sold by the firm.It follows that 
the proportion of firms which do not comply with the minimum wage 
law is given by : 
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 Lemma 1 
   We have the following statics comparatives: 
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      3. Wages and Employment Under Non Compliance 
       In contrast to the existing literature, we assume that wage rate in the 
sector where the minimum wage law is not respected is determined by a 
lateral contract between workers and the non compliant firms. Suppose  
that the workers in the informal sector who are paid a wage ww
o
 know 
the distribution of firms that  do not apply the minimum wage law and 
are able to offer them a lateral contract which specifies the wage rate at 
which they are willing to work for them. The worker offers the contract, 
the firm may either take it or leave it. The following result characterizes 
the optimal contract for a simple functional form of the density of non- 
compliance costs. 
  
     Proposition 1 
     Suppose that    1,0 ,  ccH   and  1,0c . Then the optimal contract 
is given by  :         
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Proof: 
The informal sector worker offers a wage contract to the firm which 
maximizes his expected rent, whence she solves: 
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The first order condition yields : 
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which , combined with the assumption on the functional of the 
distribution, yields the desired result :          
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Proposition 1 shows that the wage offered by the worker to the firms is a 
weighted combination of the competitive wage and the minimum wage. 
It is independent of the government policy   fq, . 
 Given the lateral contract, employment in the informal sector firms is 
given by the solution to the following optimization problem: 
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his yields the employment : 
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Let 
o
l be the level of hiring in the competitive sector, and,  
c
l be the level 
of hiring in the formal sector which respects the minimum wage 
legislation; Then we have the following result. 
 
 
 
 
 
   Proposotion 2 
      The hiring levels are such be that : 
cno
lll                             . ’’ 
 
    Proof: 
    The result follows directly from the concavity of the production 
function ans the fact that : 
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       4. Government Compliance Policy 
        The government can affect compliance with the minimum wage law 
by choosing its instruments   fq, , that is, the frequency of inspection 
and the penalty rate. Note that , given the contract offered and accepted 
by informal sectors, the proportion of firms which operate in the 
informal sector is given by : 
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Hence it follows the following corollary : 
 
 
  Corollary 1 
  i) The higher the minimum wage , the greater the degree of non-
compliance with law 
   ii) The smaller the wedge dividing the competitive wage and the 
minimum wage, the lesser   is the incentive not to comply with the 
legislation e.g: 
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   Proposition 3 
     1,0 o  such that the compliance inspection strategy by  the 
government i s given by :  
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Proof: Note that : 
  
 
 
one obtain the desired result.                                                                      
(Q.E.D) 
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The proposition 3 shows that in order to obtain full compliance, the 
policy for the government is to carry out inspection more frequently in 
those sectors which are more prone to evasion of the minimum wage 
law. 
 
    
 Corollary 2 
  Given the inspection effect, the proportion of firms which do not 
comply with the minimum wage legislation is given: 
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. 
     The corollary confirms the conclusion reached by Ashenfelter and 
Smith (1979) according to whom non compliance with the minimum 
wage law persists in spite of non stochastic inspection policy. The 
preceding result gives theoretical backing for their conclusion. For a 
penalty rate : 
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there will always be non-compliance with the minimum wage law, 
which lends credence to a penalty of the form suggested by Becker 
(1968). 
 
    4. Conclusion 
    In this paper we have analyzed the issue of non-compliance with 
minimum wage legislation in the context of a model which allows for 
heterogeneity in inspection stemming from the heterogeneity of the 
activities under monitoring. This uncertainty leads us to our main result 
which holds that non-compliance persists in a number of sectors, a result 
which appears to be broadly consistent with available empirical 
evidence. 
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